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Abstract
What does it mean for the United States to be powerful? The prospect of a decline in American power, especially relative to a
rising China, has attracted considerable scholarly and political attention. Despite a wealth of data, disagreements persist
regarding both the likely trajectory of the US-China balance and the most effective strategy for preserving America’s advan-
tage into the future. This article locates the source of these enduring disputes in fundamental conceptual differences over the
meaning of power itself. We map the distinct tracks of argument within the decline debate, showing that competing positions
are often rooted in differences of focus rather than disputes over fact. Most fundamental is a divide between analyses dedi-
cated to national capabilities, and others that emphasise mechanisms of relational power. This divide underpins how strate-
gists think about the goal of preserving or extending American power. We therefore construct a typology of competing
understandings of what it means for America to be powerful, to show that a strategy suited to bolstering American power
according to one deﬁnition of that goal may not support, and may even undermine, American power understood in other
ways.
Policy Implications
• Policymakers should be cognisant that the ‘power shift’ debate is not reducible to simple differences in forecasts regard-
ing material capabilities. It also encompasses fundamental differences over what it means for the United States to be
powerful.
• When evaluating claims regarding the future balance of national capabilities, insist on clarity as to what of type of argu-
ment is being made. Does it:
o Forecast a trend in conventional metrics, such as GDP or military spending?
o Dispute the adequacy of these metrics to capture qualitative differences?
o Predict that a speciﬁc policy intervention will succeed/fail in altering present trajectories?
o Posit a critical weakness in economic, military or political infrastructure that could bring about a collapse in the
capabilities of the US or its rivals?
• When developing strategy, prioritise between alternative understandings of power. Which is more important:
o The size of the gap in material capabilities between the United States and its nearest rival?
o The United States’ ability to dominate others coercively?
o The United States having sufﬁcient inﬂuence to obtain preferred outcomes consensually?
o The entrenchment and longevity of a world order with liberal characteristics?
• Strategists should acknowledge that while sometimes the policies best ﬁtted to pursuing these different ends may be
complementary, often they are not. Necessary trade-offs therefore ought to be identiﬁed and evaluated in a deliberate,
calculated and strategic manner.
When was the last time you’ve seen our country
win at anything? We don’t win anymore. . . No mat-
ter what it is, we don’t seem to have it.
-Donald Trump, 18 April 2015 (Reuters, 2015).
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All the talk of America’s economic decline is
political hot air . . . so is all the rhetoric you
hear about our enemies getting stronger and
America getting weaker. Let me tell you some-
thing. The United States of America is the most
powerful nation on Earth. Period. It’s not even
close.
-Barack Obama, 13 January 2016
(White House, 2016)
The complexity of the decline debate
The standing of the United States in the global distribution of
power, and its trajectory, is not a subject that has struggled
for attention. The suggestion that relative decline might be
underway gives rise to strong and divergent reactions among
International Relations scholars (Brooks and Wohlforth, 2016a,
b; Ikenberry, 2011; Layne, 2012; Mearsheimer, 2001), news
media (Bryant, 2015; O’Reilly, 2015), and the public at large
(Wike et al., 2015). The questions of whether US power is wan-
ing and, if so, what should be done to forestall or reverse this
have been the focus of heated disagreement at the highest
level of electoral politics.
We argue here that these enduring controversies cannot
be reduced simply to differing assessments regarding trends
in empirical data, that is, to narrow disagreement about the
present and future balance of national capabilities. Rather,
much of the decline debate is rooted in profound underly-
ing differences regarding the nature of power in interna-
tional relations, that is, about what it means for America to
be powerful. In addition, this debate often gives rise to dis-
agreements over what national strategy is best suited to
preserving and extending American power. These disagree-
ments, we argue, are not limited to the effectiveness of
speciﬁc policies in advancing an objective that all share.
Rather, they encompass fundamental divergences over the
nature of the objective itself.
This article seeks to make two contributions, each aimed
at enhancing the conceptual precision with which debates
regarding American relative power are conducted. First, we
offer a clarifying framework that systematises the underlying
structure of disputes over whether a shift in US relative
power should be anticipated. Second, we propose a typol-
ogy for categorising national strategies that aim to preserve
or extend that power.
We begin by identifying four distinct tracks of argument
within those debates about the US-China balance where
power is equated with national capabilities (see Figure 1).
These are: differing predictions regarding trends in con-
ventional metrics of national capability; claims that these
metrics are insufﬁcient to capture important qualitative
differences between US capabilities and those of others;
divergences of expectation as to whether policy interven-
tions will succeed in altering present trajectories; and
claims that the US or its rivals are vulnerable to a
catastrophic sudden reduction in capabilities due to a
critical weakness in economic, military or political infras-
tructure.
However, a different set of contributions to the decline
debate – rooted in a relational deﬁnition of power –
reject the idea that power should be primarily identiﬁed
with such capabilities. Turning to these, we identify four
understandings of how power manifests that have fea-
tured prominently in arguments that contest the likeli-
hood of American decline: the strong US position within
global networks; structural power that affords the US priv-
ileged inﬂuence; soft power that augments US leadership
by shaping preferences; and ideological hegemony, which
subverts the autonomy of others, to American advantage.
Our purpose here is not to stake out a particular position
regarding likely trends in US capabilities. Nor is it to argue that
one conceptual approach to power, or one mechanism for its
expression, is more ‘correct’ than others. Rather, our purpose
is to clarify the underlying conceptual structure of the US
decline debate, and to show that while differences over the
interpretation and forecasting of empirical data certainly have
their place within it, it also encompasses fundamental theo-
retical divergences regarding the nature of power itself.
Moreover, though it is often not articulated explicitly,
much policy disagreement – and associated political
rhetoric – revolves around these basic conceptual differ-
ences over the meaning of power. Turning to national strat-
egy, we present a typology of four alternative formulations
of the goal of maintaining or extending American power.
This is set out in Table 1. Each posits a distinct objective
derived from its understanding of power, that is to seek to
maximise one of the following: capability-gap; dominance;
inﬂuence; and liberal order longevity. Crucially, the speciﬁc
policies best suited to advancing each of these objectives
are rarely identical, and often they are at odds. Not only is
the academic decline debate sustained by conceptual dis-
cord about the nature of power, but competing policy
approaches to preserving American power have their roots
in disagreements around what it means for America to be
powerful.
Defining, measuring and comparing relative
power
Robert Dahl provided political science with its classic deﬁ-
nition of power: the ability of A to make B do what the
latter would otherwise not. This relational conception of
power, that is, power deﬁned as a relation between actors,
is not without its difﬁculties for analysts of the interna-
tional balance of power (Baldwin, 2013). One is method-
ological: the existence of A’s power cannot be veriﬁed
unless exercised, and pending that its existence is open to
doubt (Dahl, 1957). The other is conceptual: if we equate
having power with getting one’s way, how to make sense
of our intuitive understanding that those we nevertheless
persist in considering powerful regularly fail in their efforts
to control others’ behaviour, or are thwarted in the pursuit
of their goals?1 Likewise, a relatively weak state may
achieve its objectives if it is astute in how it deploys its
resources without this leading us to reclassify it as power-
ful. In other words: if we simply work backward from
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outcomes obtained to determine who is powerful, have we
deﬁned out of existence the conceptual space in which we
evaluate the quality of strategies according to their success
in translating power into the results desired by those who
possess it (Waltz, 1979)?
A common move on the part of analysts attempting to
overcome these challenges has been to focus on measuring
the national material capabilities that states seek to leverage
in their conduct of international politics. Understood this
way, state power is deﬁned as possession of a set of attri-
butes produced by internal societal development (Organski,
1968). Measuring and comparing the relative power of
states then becomes the task of quantifying and aggregat-
ing such attributes.2 As Kenneth Waltz observed, ‘states are
not placed in the top rank because they excel in one way
or another; they must score high across all relevant areas of
capability, including size of population and territory,
resource endowment, economic capability, military strength,
political stability and competence.’ (Waltz, 1979, p. 131). It is
common for states to possess strength in one or more
areas, but fall short in others, and thus fail to qualify as top-
rank powers. Such a state might, as in the case of several
large European states today, be wealthy but lack a corre-
spondingly high level of investment in armed forces. It
might, like North Korea, have a large military establishment,
but one grossly out of proportion to its economic founda-
tion. It might, like Saudi Arabia, be endowed with valuable
natural resources, but have only a modest population and
inhospitable territory. Or, like Luxembourg, it might be
wealthy but tiny: good for the bank balances of its residents,
but fatal to any aspiration to geopolitical weight.
In this section, we do two things. In the ﬁrst part, we map
the tracks of argument within capability-focused efforts at
measuring US power. In the second, we return to relational
power, considering those approaches that focus directly on
it and the mechanisms by which it operates.
The structure of arguments about relative capabilities
To illustrate the underlying structure of debates over the
future of US power where this is understood as material
capabilities, we focus on the US-China comparison. This is
because China has stood out in making rapid, major
advances across the range of great-power attributes, with
the result that debates over American decline and China’s
rise have been symbiotic (Brooks and Wohlforth, 2016a). The
argument map that follows is conveyed diagrammatically in
Figure 1.
Figure 1. Tracks of argument regarding relative capabilities
Blue = Track One
Green = Track Two
Orange = Track Three
Red = Track Four
Area of capability:
Economic, Military, 
Demographic, Societal
Focus: Trend in conventional 
headine metric  
(e.g. GDP;  military spendiing)
Trend unfolds on current 
trajectory
US superiority sustained
US superiority declines
Policy intervention 
(e.g. immigration restriction;
govt spending increases/cuts)
Trend shifts to US advantage 
Trend shifts to Chinese 
advantage
Focus: Difference not visible in 
conventional metrics 
(e.g. deep tech. superiority; 
innovation capacity)
No  significant action taken
US retains qualitative 
superiority
Policy interention
e.g. Chinese military 
modernisation/innovation 
drive
Chinese initiative succeeds,
US superiority eroded
Chinese Initiative fails, or
US advance outpaces
Focus: Structural 
vulnerabilities
(e.g. highly-leveraged banking 
system;  military dependence 
on tech superiority )
Crisis triggered: 
sudden, major loss of 
capability
Flaw remains dormant: 
trends unfold undisturbed
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Track one: trends in conventional metrics
A ﬁrst track of debate centres on conﬂicting predictions of
future trends in the conventional and most frequently-cited
metrics of national capability. Most prominent in this cate-
gory is GDP, where China’s higher rate of growth over sev-
eral decades has been the single greatest factor driving
perception that a global power shift is underway (Quah,
2011). Disagreement in this area tends to focus on how
long this can be sustained. It is universally accepted that
Chinese growth will slow as the ‘catch-up effect’ takes hold
(Matthews, 2006). Some go further, contending that ulti-
mately all growth rates regress to the mean, which would
make China overdue not merely for a gentle slowing but a
major correction (Pritchett and Summers, 2013). The timing
of any slowdown is of crucial importance because although
China’s GDP will soon match that of the US, its GDP per
capita – a second key indicator – will trail behind far longer,
perhaps forever.3 One study that extrapolates for China
based on the 20th century growth patterns of Japan and
South Korea foresees it attaining GDP per capita approxi-
mately half that of the US only by 2061, and its rate of
advance tailing off thereafter. Such gains would represent
spectacular progress, of course, but parity would remain far
distant (Aiyar et al., 2013; Hoffman and Polk, 2014; Jiang
and Yi, 2015).
The conversion of economic base into operational military
capabilities – in which at present the US enjoys an immense
global lead – is core to any shift in the international bal-
ance, which makes military spending another ubiquitously-
cited metric (SIPRI 2016). Accomplishing the conversion
requires state capacity sufﬁcient to extract the necessary
resources for foreign policy purposes (Taliaferro, 2006), and
sufﬁcient political support for doing so (Kitchen, 2010), nei-
ther of which is automatic or immediate. Even where eco-
nomic development ultimately is harnessed by growing
state capacity, there may be a lag of decades (Zakaria,
1998). Further, even once military capabilities have been
developed, power projection overseas may still be ham-
pered by insufﬁcient institutional coherence (Schweller,
2006), or by domestic political resistance (Dueck, 2006).
China has increased its real-terms annual military spending
by 132 per cent over the last decade and is committed to
continuing increases. Forecasting whether this rate of
increase will continue, and whether the US will meet it with
increases of its own, is therefore central to determining
expectations regarding power shifts. If present economic
growth trends were to continue for an extended period,
China could have the resources to equal the absolute dollar
amount of US military spending even while a sizeable gap
in per capita GDP persisted.4
Demographic projections often loom large in differences
of opinion regarding economic and military trajectories,
since national population supplies the human capital
required for production, the consumers to drive growth in
domestic markets, and the personnel necessary for armed
forces. The stark fact of China’s enormous population –
1.4 billion people to America’s 323 million–goes a long way
to explaining the widespread intuition that its rise presents
a challenge to the US of a different order than that posed
by economic rivals like Germany or Japan during their peri-
ods of rapid postwar growth. Equally, a common riposte to
any prediction that China will eventually overtake the US is
to note that the US has, for a developed country, a robust
level of annual population growth. This is not, it should be
acknowledged, primarily due to fertility rates, which are his-
torically low, but to net immigration (Livingston, 2018).
China, however, lags behind on both. This is not by chance:
legally restricting reproduction was a deliberate step in Chi-
na’s strategy to accelerate development and raise living
standards (Fong, 2016). But unless something changes, an
unintended consequence will be a rising dependency ratio
of non-working to working population that could block the
country from reaching American levels of wealth: China, in
the common phrase, may get old before it gets rich (Cai
and Wang, 2006; Hilton, 2011). China could seek to mitigate
the impact on government ﬁnances by declining to provide
American levels of welfare for the old, but this would not
erase the underlying economic drag of a reduced working-
age population.5
In the ﬁnal analysis, arguments on this ﬁrst track are
reducible to predictive wagers regarding a ﬁxed set of pub-
licly accessible, widely-cited metrics. Disagreements of this
type have the happy quality of being deﬁnitively resolvable
through the passage of time and the accumulation of new
statistical data. We may not be able to know for sure today
who is (in)correct, but in due course we assuredly will.
Track two: deeper dimensions of superiority
The second track of debate centres on claims that the
most frequently cited metrics fail to convey the true scale
and substance of America’s lead in capabilities. One such
argument is that GDP statistics inadequately capture levels
of knowledge-based productivity, innovative capacity and
deep technological sophistication that render the US econ-
omy qualitatively superior to the Chinese (Brooks and
Wohlforth, 2016a; Coyle, 2015). Another is that national
GDP ﬁgures obscure how large a proportion of Chinese
production is in fact owned and executed by corporate
entities with a chain of ownership rooted in the United
States (Starrs, 2013). Similarly, some assessments of relative
military capability argue that raw spending ﬂows are too
crude a measure to capture differences in the extent and
quality of actual capabilities. Close analysts emphasise that
US superiority rests not merely on higher annual budgets
today, but on the accumulated fruits of decades of invest-
ment in research and development, technology, doctrine
and human resources (Beckley, 2011; Itzkowitz Shifrinson
and Beckley, 2013).
This track of argument – that predictions of decline rest
on metrics that are too superﬁcial – calls on participants in
debates about power to show a more sophisticated under-
standing of the relationship between indicators of capabili-
ties and capabilities themselves. It is a call, in essence, for
more and better data. In the economic realm, we might
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perhaps monitor the number of transnational corporations in
the hands of Chinese nationals.6 On innovation capacity, ana-
lysts might incorporate data on patents, or the degree to
which Chinese-owned intellectual property is exploited glob-
ally by native start-ups in a manner comparable to the great
global success stories of US tech.7 To detect true erosion of
the United States’ military superiority, it will be necessary to
assess whether increases in Chinese spending have trans-
lated into shifts in effective force capacity (Heginbotham
et al., 2015). The accumulation of new and more advanced
hardware is one obvious manifestation of this. US defence
planners adjusting their strategic plans to reﬂect the reality
of new Chinese capabilities is another (Kazianis, 2015).
Within this second track, some debate may endure over
which metrics of capability are most equivalent to the
capabilities themselves. Nonetheless, there is nothing
intrinsic within this track to prevent, in principle, broad
consensus surrounding the trajectory of the US-China bal-
ance. The task of those who argue that prevailing metrics
do not tell the whole story is to respond with an
extended menu of metrics to facilitate the more compre-
hensive and accurate assessment of capabilities they wish
to see.
Track three: betting on the outcome of policy
interventions
The third track of debate, which branches from each of the
ﬁrst two, is focused on anticipating the success or failure of
deliberate policy interventions. The ﬁrst task of analysts of
relative power is to assess current levels of national capabil-
ity, and project how trends in these might unfold into the
future. National governments, however, having engaged in
such analysis themselves, are likely to take action seeking to
alter the course of those trends. A key question at issue,
then, is whether such policy efforts will succeed.
For example, all agree that much of China’s economic
growth has been thanks to adoption or imitation of Western
technology and designs, and that ultimately it must increase
its capacity for home-grown innovation (Abrami et al., 2014;
Shah et al., 2015). The Chinese government, being acutely
aware of this, has formulated policies intended to overcome
this barrier to progress, but assessments of their likely
impact differ (Huang, 2013; Lange, 2015; McGregor, 2010).
Likewise, Beijing’s defence budget increases are linked to a
strategic plan for modernisation of China’s armed forces
(Cordesman et al., 2013; State Council Information Ofﬁce
2015). Further, simply replicating present US military assets
would not afford China true parity of capabilities with the
US. Achieving that requires fostering the capacity to con-
ceive and develop the as-yet-unknown weapons, defences
and doctrines that will be decisive in the military engage-
ments of the future (Cheung, 2014; Rogers, 2014). While a
policy of cyber-espionage enabling imitation of US techno-
logical advances may be a partial workaround for inferior
R&D capacity, most analysts agree that in the long run it is
no substitute.8 Demographic trajectories are also subject to
policy intervention. China has already loosened population
controls, though, as some have pointed out, policies to
actively boost birth or immigration rates are politically chal-
lenging (Luo, 2015; Qiao, 2006).
We should remember, meanwhile, that the United States’
advantages are not immune from being augmented or
undermined by government policy interventions, so argu-
ments on this track must also anticipate these. This is most
obvious when it comes to choices regarding levels of tech-
nology and infrastructure investment. But to give an exam-
ple less frequently considered as relating to the
international balance of power: America’s relatively opti-
mistic demographic projections could be signiﬁcantly altered
if a new era of restrictionism in immigration policy, such as
that advocated by President Trump and other senior ofﬁcials
since 2017, were to take hold (Baker, 2017).
Like the ﬁrst two tracks of argument, it should be possible
to establish over time, with detailed study, the impact of
policy choices on relative capabilities. Because policy inter-
ventions are multiple, and dynamic in nature, any single
assessment of their effects will necessarily be a snapshot of
the situation at a given point in time. And further shifts in
policy will require further updates to the projected trajecto-
ries of trends upon which their impact is felt. But even with
these challenges stipulated, there is nothing intrinsic to this
track of argument that precludes in principle the formation
of broad consensus.
Track four: identifying critical vulnerabilities, or sources of
fundamental disruption
Fourth and ﬁnally, there are the prophecies of sudden
unravelling. Within this track sit claims that one or other
competing society or economy has a singular ﬂaw, dormant
for now, that will one day manifest in a crisis. This is
asserted quite often with regard to the Chinese economy,
with concern expressed about liabilities concealed in an
opaque shadow banking system (Barboza, 2013; McArdle,
2013), a property bubble (Glaeser et al., 2016), and stock
market distortions arising from government intervention
(Lee, 2015). A major unwinding originating in such deep
vulnerabilities could not merely bend the curve of long-
term growth but wipe out years or decades of prior accu-
mulation of national wealth. The highly advanced and diver-
siﬁed economy of the United States, meanwhile, is generally
presumed to be more resilient. But as the ﬁnancial crisis of
2008–09 exposed, it is not without vulnerability to system-
level risk (Financial Crisis Enquiry Commission 2011).
Other variants on this track of argument posit that a sud-
den disruption of the military balance could be triggered by
a game-changing technological leap. It is clear that com-
mand of information and data is becoming an ever-more
valuable currency, and cyber assets are now critical to many
kinetic military operations (Bonner, 2014). At present, this
appears to buttress America’s advantage because of its pre-
sumed lead in developing the requisite skills. But possible
futures are readily conceivable in which China, rather than
seeking to replicate the full extent of US hardware and sys-
tems, instead acquires the asymmetric means to neutralise
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them. This could take the conventional form of new battle-
ﬁeld weaponry, such as the ‘carrier-killer’ missiles some fore-
cast will radically impede American freedom to operate in
the South China Sea (Myers, 2018). Or it might take less
material form: offensive cyber capabilities able to disable the
high-tech networks on which much of America’s military and
economic superiority rests (Department of Defense 2016).
Related, there is the radical possibility that disruptive
technology might profoundly change the nature of the
capabilities that matter for the international balance (Mann,
1986). For example, some believe additive manufacturing
(3D printing) will upend the prevailing trade order (McKin-
sey Global Institute 2013); or that a fourth industrial revolu-
tion of automation and connectivity is creating new
categories of threat (UBS, 2016); or that innovation in
power-generation will reduce the global economy’s reliance
on fossil fuels (Bradford, 2008). Such disruptions have the
potential to shift what Mann calls the leading edge of
power by fundamentally altering the strategic geography
of the planet (Buzan and Lawson, 2015; Mann, 1986). All
capability-centric projections must be appended with an
asterisk accordingly.
Finally, perhaps the most common argument on this
track centres on political risk. Sudden political change in
China could have seismic economic consequences, a fact
that gives even earnest liberals pause as to the desirability
of rapid democratisation (Bell, 2015). The reverse is also
true: if economic growth were to stall, and with it rises in
living standards, the Chinese one-party system could col-
lapse into disorder, or be forced to shore up its authority
through escalating domestic repression (O’Mahoney and
Wang, 2014; Shirk, 2009). US institutions, though of greater
proven longevity, are not invulnerable. For over a decade,
the American constitutional system has been put under
escalating strain by polarisation and partisanship (Mann
and Ornstein, 2016). The increasingly disorderly process of
funding the federal government, with Congressional votes
attended by threats of credit default and government shut-
down, may suggest degrading functionality of key institu-
tions (Weisman and Peters, 2013). The election of public
ofﬁce-holders who display overt antagonism toward liberal
democratic norms has raised further concern over both the
administrative competence of the government and the
security of the rule of law (Frum, 2017; Klein, 2017;
Sullivan, 2016). This has been exacerbated by criminal
investigation of senior ofﬁcials for collusion with Russian
interference in the 2016 election, obstruction of justice,
and ﬁnancial impropriety. All predictions regarding
America’s future national power entail an implicit judge-
ment on whether these present challenges can be con-
tained or are indicative of a longer-term decay in the
performance of American institutions (Ikenberry, 2002).
The signiﬁcance of this fourth track of argument is to
introduce uncertainty irrespective of the degree of consen-
sus that might be reachable across the ﬁrst three tracks. The
occurrence of ‘black swan’ events that render the most
assiduously constructed trend forecasts null and void is an
occupational hazard of all that engage in these debates.
Nevertheless, these do not signify any internal contradiction
that vitiates the purposefulness of forecasting itself.
In summary: mapping capabilities-focused arguments
about the US-China balance reveals distinct logical tracks of
disagreement that turn on identifying and prioritising data,
forecasting trends, and judging the likely outcomes of policy
interventions. Though this is a complex picture, claims
within these arguments are commensurable, in that they are
part of a single coherent enquiry. Analysis of capabilities,
however, is only part of the debate around American power.
Relational approaches – which treat capabilities as relevant
inputs, but more closely associate power with obtaining the
outcomes one desires through interaction with others –
pose a competing understanding of what it means to be
powerful. We now turn to these.
Forms of relational power
Both the potential utility and the complexity of measuring
material capabilities as a proxy for power will by now be
apparent. Some analysts, however, noting the limitations of
such metrics (Merritt and Zinnes, 1988), prefer to focus on
the mechanisms by which states exercise it (Baldwin, 1989;
Barnett and Duvall, 2005; Dahl, 1957; Frey, 1971; Lasswell
and Kaplan, 2013). Capabilities-focused assessments of rela-
tive power implicitly assume a generally close correspon-
dence between those capabilities and a state’s ability to
control the behaviour of others. By contrast, relational
approaches posit that the link is more tenuous (Baldwin
2016). While not denying that capabilities are important,
these approaches emphasise that ‘power is not itself a
resource’, but rather ‘resources are the media through which
power is exercised’ (Giddens, 1979, p. 91).
The primary importance of this move lies in its carving
out intellectual space to argue that, in certain circumstances,
a state’s power might be maintained at the same level even
if its ranking in material capabilities were to be diminished.
In debates on American power, the mild version of this
claim is that there is a lag: even if its advantage in capabili-
ties erodes, the US will continue for a time to exercise dis-
proportionate inﬂuence over others as a legacy beneﬁt of
relational pathways established during its period of material
dominance. The stronger version of the claim would be that
there is no necessary causal connection between one shift
and the other: that the US can somehow indeﬁnitely sustain
a superior capacity to get its way that exceeds its compara-
tive position in material capabilities.
We identify here four forms in which relational accounts
suggest American power manifests:
Network position: states do not try to inﬂuence others’
actions exclusively through bilateral interactions at the top
level of government. They operate within complex networks
of connections, alliances, and understandings, which link
both state apparatuses and civil society at multiple levels.
Sometimes, these networks operate within international
institutions and organisations; often they are less formal.
They serve as delivery channels for coercive demands and
persuasive efforts, and provide a setting for both to be
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responded to. Not all states are equal in this regard: the US
occupies a central position within myriad networks, and
some argue this affords America a valuable edge over rising
competitors. As Anne-Marie Slaughter (2009, p. 94) suc-
cinctly states the case: ‘In this world, the measure of power
is connectedness’. If this is true, then the US might aspire,
by retaining this advantage, to be no less powerful even as
its margin of economic and military superiority eroded.
Structural power: the US is not just well-networked. It also
enjoys a privileged position conferred by what Susan
Strange (2015, p. 27) termed structural power: the ability ‘to
shape frameworks within which states relate to each other’.
When a state has a great advantage in material capabilities,
the mechanisms of structural power help convert this into
inﬂuence over others (Gruber, 2000; Wade, 2013). Once
established, however, such mechanisms can be persistent
and resilient even if the underlying material superiority that
gave rise to them erodes (Wade, 2011). Today’s rules-based
international order was established during a period of
immense economic imbalance favouring the US, and the
institutional legacy of that period continues to buttress US
primacy (Gilpin, 2002; Ikenberry, 2001). An example of the
United States’ formal privilege is its special status and voting
weight in institutions such as the UN Security Council, IMF
and World Bank, which affords it substantial control over
their agendas.9 A less explicitly institutionalised, but no less
real, instance is the ‘exorbitant privilege’ conferred by the
US dollar’s status as the dominant global reserve currency,
which allows it to raise capital more cheaply and measur-
ably boosts national GDP (Eichengreen, 2012; Norrlof, 2010).
If the precedent of Britain’s decline is any guide, there could
be a lag of decades before such arrangements adjust to
fully reﬂect any underlying shift in the United States’ relative
economic weight.10
Soft power: states can also co-opt one another through
the appeal of their own characteristics, something Joseph
Nye captured in the concept of soft power. In the years
since its initial coinage, ‘soft power’ has become a ubiqui-
tous term, often deployed imprecisely as a synonym for all
non-violent forms of inﬂuence, or even coercion by non-
military means. In its more speciﬁc original sense, however,
it means displaying social, political and cultural attributes
and values that others ﬁnd attractive and seek to emulate
(Gallarotti, 2010; Nye, 2002). Over time, it is posited, this
fosters a commonality of worldview that leads others to
‘want what you want’ (Nye, 2004: 256). In policy terms,
states may seek to operationalise their soft power through
diplomatic means: framing agendas, deploying persuasive
rhetoric and actively encouraging ‘positive attraction’ (Nye,
2011, p. 19). Manifested in this way, soft power can resem-
ble structural and ideological power; most forms of prefer-
ence-shaping overlap to some degree, and it is certainly
true that soft power operates indirectly – through what
others ﬁnd attractive rather than through negotiation of
speciﬁc demands (Laifer and Kitchen, 2017). However,
whereas structural forms of power operate at the level of
decision-making and agenda-setting, and ideological power
shapes unconscious frameworks, soft-power’s focus on the
speciﬁc dynamics of attraction and voluntary emulation dis-
tinguish its particular role.
The United States has an advantage in this regard,
according to Nye and others, because its broadly liberal cul-
ture and political values have wider appeal across borders
than those of rivals. This claim demands some cautionary
caveats: that making soft power work as public policy is
challenging (Laifer and Kitchen, 2017; Nye 2004); that the
US regularly falls short of embodying its professed ideals;
and that the world is far from unanimous and unqualiﬁed in
its admiration of America (Wike et al., 2015). Despite China’s
alleged inherent disadvantages in soft power, the concept
has attracted great strategic and practical policy interest
there (Mingjiang, 2008; Wang, 2008; Nye and Jisi, 2009;
Shambaugh, 2015). Nevertheless, in one 2016 ranking based
on a compound metric of indicators, the US placed ﬁrst
globally for soft power, with China ranked just 28th
(McClory, 2016). The extent to which soft power is ultimately
derivative of material superiority (Kearn, 2011), or indeed
may help foster it (Rose, 2016), is contested. But if the rela-
tion between the two were a simple one, we should expect
a close correspondence between capabilities and soft-power
ranking, and China’s present position suggests at minimum
a substantial lag before capability gains are translated into
proportional growth in soft power.
Ideological hegemony: the deepest sources of inﬂuence
over behaviour are ideational frameworks that shape prefer-
ences below the radar of explicit political consciousness. If a
dominant state can embed its preferred ideas so deeply that
others perceive them only as ambient assumptions about
reality and appropriateness, this removes the need for coer-
cive actions, or even persuasive ones, aimed at directing
their behaviour.11 From a critical perspective, this can be
read as a form of hegemonic power: subversion of the
autonomy of others by the exercise of invisible inﬂuence
over the intellectual space in which they deﬁne their iden-
tity and interests (Cox, 1981, 1983). One way of framing the
history of post-Second World War US foreign policy is that it
succeeded in doing exactly this: internationalising its own
preferences by successfully establishing liberal norms as the
universal standard of appropriateness for economic and
diplomatic conduct. If this ‘American system’ proves capable
of integrating and socialising rising powers, this might mean
the sustained alignment of the norms of world order with
US preferences long after present levels of US material supe-
riority have past.12
This type of power does necessitate a caveat, however. If
what were once merely American preferences truly have
been converted into norms widely regarded as possessing
inherent legitimacy, is it accurate to characterise the contin-
ued hegemony of those norms as a manifestation of Ameri-
can power? If, hypothetically, the US does not wield liberal
norms instrumentally, and does not consciously conceive of
them as a vehicle for advancing speciﬁcally national objec-
tives by manipulating others, thoughts, are they nonetheless
best understood as tools of national power? Or, an even
more acute question: if the US Government ceases to be a
committed subscriber to liberal ideals – do they represent a
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vehicle for American national power, or a constraint upon
it? This question takes on pointed importance when we
come to consider US strategic priorities, as we do in the
next section.
Just as in the case of economic, military and demo-
graphic capabilities, other governments can undertake
deliberate policy efforts to gain ground on the United
States in each of these four areas of relational advantage.
How will we know if they are succeeding? In the economic
sphere, China has been rapidly expanding its network of
trade, ﬁnance, and investment ties via ‘partnership diplo-
macy’ (Zhongping and Jing, 2014). It has also created a
major new formal institution, the Asia Infrastructure Invest-
ment Bank (AIIB) (Krauss and Bradsher, 2015; Pandey, 2015;
Womack, 2013). The proportion of international lending
that takes place via the AIIB and from China bilaterally will
be important indicators (Ferdinand, 2016). Some shrinking
of the overrepresentation of American nationals among
top personnel at global economic institutions such as the
IMF and World Bank might be a sign of reduced advan-
tage. Even more so would be adjustment of the relative
voting weights of the US and China in the governance of
those institutions. The dollar’s status as the world’s primary
reserve currency is a cornerstone of US structural power; a
plausible proxy for the security of this would be the pro-
portion of global reserves held in dollars, as well as its
weighting in the IMF’s basket of currencies (Bradsher,
2015). Beyond the economic sphere, a sign of erosion in
the US position would be the loosening of strategic alli-
ances in Europe and Asia. Even in the absence of formal
treaty changes, shifts in rhetoric and resource allocation
could be meaningful (Wright, 2017). It also would be signif-
icant if China were to become a leading originator of inno-
vation in transnational governance; this has been the
almost exclusive preserve of the US and its allies (Hale and
Held, 2011). Consensus is elusive on what metrics best cap-
ture soft power, but as noted above, efforts have been
made (McClory, 2016).
The deepest form of long-term inﬂuence over behaviour,
ideological hegemony, is also the hardest in which to
measure a shift. For China, to successfully challenge the sta-
tus quo in this regard would be far more difﬁcult even than
matching US material capabilities (Beeson and Li, 2015). It
would entail ﬁrst articulating distinct principles of its own
that run contrary to the established order, and advocating
for them as a programmatic alternative to which it seeks
converts. And even if this enjoyed a degree of success,
merely carving out a Chinese sphere of ideological inﬂuence
would not be sufﬁcient to equal the accomplishment of the
United States at peak power, which has been to establish its
principles as the embedded normative architecture of a truly
global order. Even by the most bullish assessments, this is a
distant vision for China.13 Nevertheless, informed reporting
indicates that its leader’s ultimate ambitions may be on this
scale (Osnos, 2018).
National strategy and priority: what kind of power
does America most want?
Four alternatives
Every US politician, ofﬁcial and strategist would say they
wish America to have as much power in the world as possi-
ble. Such apparent consensus, however, obfuscates more
than it reveals. Disagreements over how best to maximise
American power are rarely reducible to purely technocratic
differences over the effectiveness of a given set of policies.
More often, they encompass deeper conceptual divergence
as to the type of power the United States should prioritise
possessing. Building on the distinctions established in the
previous section, we propose here a typology of four dis-
tinct ways of thinking about power maximisation. These are
set out in Table 1.
The ﬁrst conceptual type is the capability-gap maximiser.
To think this way is to equate an erosion of American supe-
riority in capabilities, in and of itself, with a decline in
power. Viewed through this lens, it makes no sense to speak
of the United States managing to sustain its power advan-
tage despite a shrinking marginal lead in economic and mili-
tary capabilities. The capability gap is American power; loss
Table 1. The power-maximiser typology: four alternative priorities
Capability-gap maximiser Dominance maximiser Inﬂuence maximiser
Liberal order longevity
maximiser
Strategic Goal Primacy; command of
the commons
Displays of obedience Inﬂuence over others Hegemony of favoured
norms
Primary
Analytical
Focus
Relative national
capabilities
Coercive application of
capabilities
Mechanisms for engineering
consensual outcomes
International social
order
Behaviour
Sought
Acceptance Compliance with authority Shaped preferences Shared preferences
Primary Means Military spending;
economic growth
Threat of military or
economic sanction
Institution-building and diplomacy Example and
socialisation
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of the former is ipso facto loss of the latter. Adopting this
perspective simpliﬁes the focus for any argument over the
trajectory of US relative power (though as the relevant sub-
sections earlier in this article make clear, this by no means
makes all disagreement trivially easy to resolve). Strategists
adopting this priority should not necessarily be dismissed as
fetishising capabilities for their own sake; US primacy in
capabilities may have beneﬁcial consequences. Some realist
scholarship, for instance, has argued that demonstrably
unchallengeable American primacy in capabilities increases
geopolitical stability because the only available response is
acceptance (Wohlforth, 1999). The controversial 1992 draft
Defense Planning Guidance produced by the US Depart-
ment of Defense is an example of a strategy premised on
prioritising capability-gap maximisation in stark terms (Gell-
man, 1992; New York Times 1992).
The second type is the dominance maximiser. To think this
way is to understand US power as the ability to compel com-
pliance from other states in response to speciﬁc demands.
Superiority in national capabilities is important to a strategist
prioritising dominance, since success often depends on hav-
ing the resources required to issue or imply credible threats.
But this type of thinking differs from the previous one in its
primary concern with relational outcomes: to satisfy a domi-
nance-maximiser that the United States is powerful, US capa-
bilities must be applied coercively, with positive results.
Importantly, this mindset does not, as some others do, see
implicit weakness in the resort to coercion, that is, as reveal-
ing that consensual preference-shaping must have been tried
and failed. On the contrary: from a dominance perspective,
the more disinclined others are to alter their behaviour, the
greater the demonstration of power entailed in compelling
them to do so. For this reason, dominance should not simply
be viewed as the next-best, fallback approach of an unsuc-
cessful inﬂuence maximiser. A strategist who attaches the
highest value to dominance will therefore be chieﬂy con-
cerned with, and identify the test of American power with,
instances of open confrontation where another state deﬁnes
its interests in opposition to those of the US and deﬁes its
demands. High-proﬁle examples of such confrontations in
recent years might be with the governments of Iran, North
Korea, Syria or perhaps Russia. Milder forms of conﬂict, such
as with allies, may also at times manifest similar dynamics. For
a dominance maximiser, the measure of power is how fre-
quently and fully the US can force others to back down once
antagonistic positions have been adopted (Holmes, 2016).
The third type is the inﬂuence maximiser. This way of
thinking shares with the dominance maximiser a concern
with relational outcomes, that is, the ability to deliberately
steer the behaviour of others. But it discounts the value of
overt displays of coerced obedience. For a strategist priori-
tising inﬂuence, US power should be measured by how fre-
quently and closely the outcomes of international
interactions correlate with those for which the US has advo-
cated, especially in collective decision-making settings. The
primary form this advocacy takes is not explicit or even
implied coercion, but rather the channels for diplomacy and
preference-shaping highlighted by theorists of networks,
institutions and structural power. The inﬂuence maximiser is
distinguished from the dominance maximiser by the fact
that coercive measures, though they can be deployed when
necessary, are considered an unsatisfactory last resort, reve-
latory of weakness and symptomatic of the failure of the
preferred currency of power. Importantly, the inﬂuence max-
imiser values the liberal framework of norms and institutions
primarily for purely instrumental reasons: as a means by
which the US can seek to orchestrate behaviour, at lower
cost than coercion.
Establishing and maintaining inﬂuence through networks
and institutions carries a price, however, in that the US must
be willing to periodically forego opportunities for short-term
transactional gain in order to be seen as upholding estab-
lished rules. Since a liberal rules-based order is premised on
the willingness of participants to prioritise absolute gains
over relative, this entails a long-term trade-off that likely
conﬂicts with the priority of the capability gap maximiser.
Signiﬁcantly, the inﬂuence maximiser does not consider that
they are de-prioritising national power in this trade-off in
order to pursue other beneﬁts. The reason they are pre-
pared to tolerate a smaller lead for the US in capabilities, if
it contributes to retaining structures and institutions that
privilege US inﬂuence, is that for them the latter is power of
the most important kind.
The fourth and ﬁnal conceptual type is the liberal order
longevity maximiser. To think in this way is to identify Ameri-
can power with the established norms that constitute and
underwrite the liberal rules-based world order. Unlike the
inﬂuence maximiser, however, a strategist with this priority
does not value liberal norms and institutions primarily as
instruments for the United States to engineer speciﬁc out-
comes favouring its concrete interests. Rather, they invest
with overriding intrinsic value the objective of embedding the
liberal order as a permanent foundation for international
society. This makes it a goal of the highest priority to convince
rising powers to become responsible rule-upholding stake-
holders, even if accomplishing this requires both tolerating
some reduction in the US lead in capabilities and trading
away some of America’s structural and institutional privileges.
This last entry is potentially the most contentious cate-
gory within the typology. This is because it is a matter for
dispute whether the establishment of liberal international
order is correctly characterised as perpetuating speciﬁcally
American power. The nature of ideological hegemony, suc-
cessfully established, is that it limits the ideological band-
width of actors across the system without their awareness
(Buzan and Lawson, 2014). Even the powerful state whose
past leaders originated the prevailing ideology may no
longer perceive that prevalence as an exercise in power on
their part. Certainly, those who object to the universalisation
of liberal norms often view them as a manifestation of
American power (Hardt and Negri, 2000). But if the liberal
rules-based order survives and thrives as a de-territorialised
hegemonic paradigm at the same time as US power in the
preceding three senses – capabilities, dominance, inﬂuence
– wanes, this will assuredly be unsatisfactory to a great
many American politicians and strategists, less willing to
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equate the US national interest with the triumph of globalist
liberal principles. In an inversion of dominance as deﬁned
earlier, those prioritising ideological power will consider it
most deeply and successfully established when it is com-
pletely invisible.
Implications of the typology – why does this matter?
The categories outlined above are ideal types. Actually
existing leaders and strategists may shift over time in the
type to which their thinking most closely corresponds. And
an individual, or state, may at any given time manifest ele-
ments of more than one type in their statements and
actions. The value of the typology lies not in its ability to
seal all real-world actors neatly within boxes, but in its util-
ity as an analytical tool to identify unresolved tensions
within national strategy debates. The fact that individuals
may vacillate unreﬂectively between the understandings of
power distinguished in the typology serves to underscore,
not undermine, its usefulness in this regard.
Greater conceptual clarity around what participants in the
debate about American power mean by power is crucial,
because the four ways of thinking outlined here do not
always have uniform or complementary implications for
national strategy. Of course, some disputes do come down
simply to disagreement as to the likely effectiveness of pro-
posed courses of action. For example, individuals may differ
over whether a particular economic policy will boost long-
term growth; or a military investment programme will pay
dividends in useful assets; or a particular package of threats
and inducements will persuade an adversary to change its
behaviour; or whether a negotiation strategy is likely to
secure the desired outcome in an institutional setting. In
such cases, there is a shared understanding of the objective,
with divergence limited to the matter of what means will be
most effective. Often, however, disputes that superﬁcially
appear to ﬁt this description contain, concealed, deeper
underlying divergences as to the kind of power that should
be prioritised. That is to say, the disagreement concerns not
merely appropriate means, but ultimate ends. This is signiﬁ-
cant because ways and means likely to advance American
power understood in one way may not do so in others;
indeed, they may actively undermine it.
For example, consider a strategy of major increases in US
defence spending, combined with encircling military deploy-
ments in East Asia. Such policies might well maximise the
capability gap the US enjoys over China; yet as a means of
forcing Chinese compliance with US demands, that is, max-
imising dominance, its efﬁcacy would be far less assured. At
the same time, such aggressive cultivation and deployment
of hard power resources might severely undermine US inﬂu-
ence over China within international institutions across a
range of issues. Or a second example: granting China higher
status and increased voting weight in institutions of interna-
tional economic and security governance. This might con-
tribute to the longevity of the liberal world order by
persuading China to become a responsible stakeholder; but
it might at the same time reduce America’s ability to use
those institutions as vehicles for magnifying its own inﬂu-
ence and engineering its preferred substantive outcomes. Or
a third: continuing to trade with China on present terms. On
balance, this likely contributes to preserving international
structures that boost US inﬂuence, and to further embed-
ding liberal order. It will also beneﬁt the US economy in
absolute terms. Over time, however, it is likely to facilitate
relative gains for China in terms of its economic and military
capabilities.
The point here is a simple one: while the headline goal of
‘preserving American power’ may be uncontroversial, differ-
ent underpinning understandings of power often mandate
markedly different courses of action in pursuit of it. Arriving at
robust judgments about the policies, investments, and trade-
offs required for a successful national strategy demands con-
ceptual clarity regarding the speciﬁc type of power to be pri-
oritised. It remains, of course, intellectually possible to argue
that one course of policy action optimally blends pursuit of all
forms of power such that all are maximised at once. Indeed,
this rhetorical move is a reﬂex for many in the political realm,
since it avoids the need to overtly acknowledge uncomfort-
able trade-offs. However, the onus should be upon those who
advocate for such a panacean position to articulate explicitly
how their preferred course reconciles the quite distinct ends
speciﬁed in the typology here.
Conclusions
The future trajectory of American relative power is a ques-
tion to which a great many analysts and scholars have pro-
vided their own diverse answers. We have not sought to
add yet another here. Instead, we have sought to clarify
the nature of the debate itself, that it might be better
understood. Why is this important? First, because argu-
ments which seek to advance or rebut the proposition that
American relative power is in decline often fail to render
their conceptual underpinnings fully explicit. From the per-
spective of rigorous social scientiﬁc enquiry, there are
intrinsic beneﬁts to doing so. Lack of conceptual clarity
often results in analysis that is partial, and debates in which
participants speak at cross-purposes. Frequently, divergent
conclusions about the future trajectory of American power
hinge less on competing empirical claims than on what
understanding of power is implicitly adopted at the outset.
Today’s decline debate is the latest manifestation of a con-
versation that has already run for several decades, the bal-
ance of mainstream opinion tipping back and forth with
the headlines and political mood of the period (Cox, 2001).
For contemporary arguments to amount to more than cycli-
cal rehearsal of familiar positions, greater discipline regard-
ing both deﬁnition of terms and tracks of argument is
needed.
Second, the distinctions sharpened here are not just aca-
demic in their signiﬁcance: they have implications for the
strategies of leaders and the actions of states. That Ameri-
can leaders would wish to preserve or extend American
power is a given. Effective strategy in service of that end,
however, requires clear thinking about what it means for
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America to be powerful. Only then can consistent and
coherent choices of priority be made between the distinct
strategic alternatives available and the trade-offs they may
require. One cannot plan for success unless one has deﬁned
what success looks like.
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1. In violent conﬂicts during in the second half of the 20th century,
the weaker actor in terms of capabilities won more often than the
stronger actor (Arreguin-Toft, 2001).
2. Examples include the National Material Capabilities data set (v. 5.0)
(Singer et al., 1972; Tellis et al., 2000).
3. In 2015, according to the World Bank, the US-China comparison
was $56,116 to $8,069.
4. All discussion of Chinese military budgets must come with a caveat
that its ofﬁcial statistics may be unreliable, concealing signiﬁcant
amounts of relevant spending (Perlo-Freeman, 2014).
5. For a detailed outline of the Chinese pension system see Pension
Funds Online, Wilmington Insight, China. Available from: https://
www.pensionfundsonline.co.uk/content/country-profiles/china/105
[Accessed 24 October 2018].
6. Getting hard information may be challenging, see Forsythe and
Ansﬁeld, 2016.
7. China has become the world leader in patent-ﬁling, though the sig-
niﬁcance is subject to interpretation, see Jones, 2016.
8. On US vulnerability and China’s concerted efforts, see Shanker and
Bumiller, 2011; Krasny, 2014.
9. This is the second face of power (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962, 1963).
10. The US had surpassed Britain’s GDP by the 1870s and its trade vol-
ume by 1913, but the dollar did not overtake sterling as the leading
reserve currency until the mid-1920s and its dominance was not
ﬁrmly established until the late 1930s. This lag would have been
longer but for the amount of British capital liquidated by the Sec-
ond World War (Eichengreen and Flandreau, 2009).
11. This corresponds to the third face of power proposed by Steven
Lukes (2005).
12. In Ikenberry’s (2011) memorable phrase, the present world order is
easy to join and hard to overturn.
13. The present order has many elements; some China actively sup-
ports, others it would like to revise (see Zhang, 2016).
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